Silicon & Steel · Critical Minerals Edition

Part 3 of 3. Part 1 set out the chokepoint, Part 2 the ladder of controls. This part is the way out, and how far away it is.

The loose version of this claim is that America imports everything. It does not. USGS net import reliance for 2025 runs at 100% for gallium and natural graphite, 91% for antimony and more than 50% for germanium. For rare-earth compounds and metals it is 67%, and that figure has been falling hard, from above 95% as recently as 2023. It is the one genuinely encouraging line in this story.

While the West watches the leading edge, China has been pouring capacity into mature-node chips, the older and larger transistors that run cars, appliances, factory equipment and a great deal of military hardware. Its share of world capacity is around 28% and heading, depending on whose forecast you take, to between 33% and 39% by 2027. Dominating the cheap ubiquitous chips is its own kind of leverage, harder to see than a rare-earth ban and just as real. We went through the economics of that buildout in The 28nm Flood.

The response has started, and it is no longer a single deal. In July 2025 the Pentagon struck a public-private partnership with MP Materials: a $110 per kilogram floor on NdPr for ten years, $400 million of equity, a 100% offtake commitment and an annual earnings guarantee. MP broke ground on its 10X magnet facility in Northlake, Texas in early 2026, commissioning in 2028.

Policy followed. Proclamation 11001 in January found that imports of processed critical minerals threaten national security. In June the G7 launched a minerals alliance targeting dependence on any single outside supplier below 60% by 2030. In August the White House put more than $2 billion into mining, including $150 million for Niron Magnetics, which makes magnets with no rare earths in them at all.

Beijing noticed. On 22 June 2026, days after the G7 declaration, China put MP Materials and USA Rare Earth on its own export-control list, along with eight American drone, robotics and aerospace companies. The two companies at the centre of America's escape plan are now themselves targets.

That is the state of play going into 10 November. A price floor that is actively paying out, a magnet plant that does not commission until 2028, a G7 target set for 2030, and a suspension that lapses in ten weeks on controls that were only ever half of the problem.

10 November 2026. The truce either gets quietly renewed, lapses, or is traded for something Washington gives up elsewhere. Watch whether the October 2025 measures snap back, because those reach into foreign-made goods containing Chinese material.

Whatever happens in November, April 2025 stands. The honest indicator is not headline magnet tonnage, which has already recovered. It is dysprosium, terbium and yttrium volumes, still running at about half.

2027 and 2028. China's mature-node share lands somewhere in that 33 to 39% range, and MP's Texas plant commissions at roughly 10,000 tonnes of magnets a year. Nothing before 2028 changes the physical picture.

Watch the price, not the politics. While NdPr sits below $110 a kilogram, the American taxpayer is topping up MP's revenue every quarter. The crossover above that floor, whenever it comes, is the real signal that this industry is rebuilding rather than being subsidised.

And the wildcard. In June, Beijing stopped naming elements and started naming companies. Any Western firm that becomes materially useful is now a candidate for that list.

Investors: the durable theme is Western processing, magnets and substitution, but underwrite the policy support, not the spot price. Beijing can now name your company specifically.

Supply chain and manufacturing: map your exposure two and three tiers deep and qualify non-Chinese sources now, while the truce holds. European erbium prices are already up more than 50% since June on stockpiling ahead of the deadline.

Policymakers: leverage hides in whatever step of the chain is most concentrated. Treat refining capacity as you would a fab, as national infrastructure.

Production and import-reliance figures are from the USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026; the 85% refining share is the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026. Prices are USGS annual averages sourced to Argus, plus a Shanghai Metals Market spot assessment for August 2026. Export volumes are Chinese customs data via trade press. Shares differ by metric, which is why every chart states whether it shows mining, refining or exports. An earlier version put antimony near half of world supply; the 2026 mine-production figure is 36%, and I have corrected it. The mature-node forecast is a range because TrendForce and others disagree. Reading these moves as one coherent strategy is my framing, and the counter-case, that several were separately motivated regulatory actions, is worth holding alongside it.

Silicon & Steel Intelligence Desk, Supply Chain Strategy & Semiconductor Analysis. Nothing here is investment advice. Corrections & coffee: [email protected]